

Strengthening the New Deal from the Bottom Up: Perspectives on the Somali Compact and Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA)

Introduction

“What is the New Deal going to do for Somalia and its people? In Mogadishu, in the villages, in the districts, what will it do? What happens next?”¹

The Somali New Deal Compact is intended to “to create a better future for all Somali people, by means of a dialogue and process that promotes political reconciliation and establishes peace, security, justice and sustainable development”.² One year since its endorsement at an international conference in Brussels, this briefing assesses progress in implementing its contents and its commitment to ensuring that it remains a ‘living document’ which continues to work to build ownership by all Somalis through engagement and consultation with the Somali people.³ It draws on Somali community and civil society members’ perspectives gathered through field research in September 2014 in order to identify pressing gaps in the New Deal processes to date. These perspectives have not previously been systematically sought in relation to the Somali New Deal.

The Somali Compact contains objectives and priorities under five Peace and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) for Somalia and a separate and distinct arrangement for Somaliland, known as the Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA).⁴

Section 1 of this paper discusses perspectives on the Compact and the SSA from members of civil society and communities, identifying areas of convergence between their priorities and those set out in the Compact and SSA, as well as the gaps and areas they wanted to see more strongly prioritised. These include the need for greater emphasis on social reconciliation, strengthening and re-establishing policing services, assessing how to improve traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and emphasising the provision of quality basic services. Based on their perspectives and on Saferworld and World Vision’s own research and analysis, section 2

examines how the New Deal is and should be implemented and argues for: a greater focus on conflict sensitivity; enhancing statebuilding approaches with peacebuilding ones; advocating for the greater inclusion of community-based approaches; greater inclusion of district administrations, civil society, and the public; and strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation framework to maximise the Compact and SSA’s impacts for all people.

One year since its endorsement, there are signs that that the Compact needs to better align with the needs and priorities of people. In prioritising strengthening institutions and processes – or statebuilding – the Compact risks failing to directly mitigate conflict drivers at the community level. Missing this foundation jeopardises the success of the Compact overall.

As the process moves towards implementation, there should be greater attention to the key principles that drive the New Deal framework. The outstanding fragility assessment should be completed, and efforts made to further improve consultation, participation and inclusion. Conflict sensitive and community-based approaches should be mainstreamed throughout the Compact to promote locally owned and rooted stability and peace in Somalia and Somaliland, and the risk of conflict posed by parts of the process itself identified and addressed. Taking steps now will maximise the potential of New Deal processes to effect positive, sustainable and meaningful change.

Methodology

This briefing is based on research conducted in September 2014 in Nairobi, South Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. 14 key informant interviews were conducted with community members, government representatives and donors. 15 focus group discussions were held with communities in five towns and villages, involving 167 participants. These included women, elders, youth, children, health workers, agro-pastoralists and business people.⁵ Three civil society consultation meetings were held in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa involving 69

participants.⁶ Specific names and locations of people in communities interviewed for the research are omitted from this report in order to safeguard their privacy and security.⁷

The research is not a comprehensive survey of the views of all Somali people, but the alignment of views of those interviewed highlights a number of consistent trends and patterns. This suggests that much deeper and wider consultation is required to ensure the Compact and SSA reflect and address the most relevant range of issues for people in Somalia and Somaliland, in keeping with the core principles of the New Deal.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was agreed in December 2011 at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea.⁸ It attempts to provide a new framework – one which is country-owned and led – through which to address overlapping issues of peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development and better coordinate donors in support of those initiatives.

The New Deal uses five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals (PSGs) to guide work to move states away from fragility. These are: 1. Legitimate Politics; 2. Security; 3. Justice; 4. Economic Foundations; 5. Revenues and Services. In each context, objectives should be identified under each of the PSGs and programmes of work developed to achieve them.

Actions are planned and implemented under the **FOCUS** element of the New Deal. A regular, country-led Fragility Assessment is conducted to identify the drivers of conflict and fragility. ‘One vision, one plan’ should then be developed on the basis of the fragility assessment to support the move towards peace and stability. This is used to draft and finalise a Compact, which is the mechanism for implementation of the New Deal. The process uses the PSGs to monitor progress. Finally the New Deal supports political dialogue and leadership, including that of civil society.

The PSGs and FOCUS are complemented by **TRUST** principles. These are transparency of aid, risk sharing, the use and strengthening of country systems, the strengthening of capacities of the state and civil society, and timely and predictable aid.

At each stage of the New Deal, civil society is a partner of governments and donors.

Section 1: The relevance of, and gaps in, the New Deal

“The New Deal is suspended in the air: it needs to be brought down to the ground.”

Civil society representative, Puntland

The Somali Compact is intended to be a living document that reflects progress made under it and responds to the most important or key emerging drivers of conflict. The main body of the Compact focuses on Somalia while a separate Somaliland Special Arrangement addresses the key areas to strengthen and reinforce peace and stability gains in Somaliland.

For Somalia, the Compact does this through the five PSGs, five ‘cross-cutting’ issues (gender, capacity development, bringing tangible results to people, respect of human rights, and external relations) and nine partnership principles⁹, all intended to transform the way aid is delivered. The SSA also does this through the five PSGs (PSG 2 was initially omitted from the SSA, but was added in June 2014) as well as three cross-cutting issues (gender mainstreaming, strengthening state-society relations, and protection of human rights).

In interviews with individuals and groups in communities and civil society across Somalia and Somaliland, there was some support and agreement with the provision of technical and capacity-building support to authorities under the PSG objectives in the Compact and SSA, and agreement with some of the priorities set out under the five PSGs. The reconstruction of accountable, transparent, and inclusive state institutions at all levels and strengthening the responsiveness of the Somaliland authorities and government institutions were also recognised to be of critical importance for the sustainability of peace and stability.

However, for some, there was too much emphasis on state capacity in the objectives of the PSGs. While clearly necessary, in and of itself, capacity building alone does not directly contribute to peace and stability, particularly in a context such as Somalia. The link between capacity building and positive changes in people’s lives was not clear to many people. An exception was PSG 3, Justice, in both Somalia and Somaliland.

In addition, civil society and community members interviewed identified a number of issues missing from the objectives which they felt to be of central importance within the multiple drivers of conflict and instability in the context. They felt that insufficient attention had been given to some concerns identified in the Compact as the process moves into implementation. Some gaps were attributed by individuals within civil society to the initial development of the Compact. Pressure from the

international community to have a final version of the Compact and SSA for endorsement at a conference in Brussels in September 2013 meant that the process was accelerated and missed out a number of key steps as a result. In particular, fragility assessments were not completed. This meant that the Compact was developed, endorsed and is now moving towards implementation without a common understanding and agreement of the key causes of conflict that the Compact and SSA need to address.

Section 1a of this report compares the strategic objectives and priorities in the Somali Compact against the peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities identified by people in communities across South Central and Puntland and by members of civil society. Section 1b of the report compares the SSA with the priorities set out by members of the Somaliland public and civil society. In both instances, the report argues that the gap between these needs and the Compact and SSA should be addressed to ensure that the processes effectively respond to the key drivers of conflict and fragility and thus ensure that the Compact and SSA truly become living, relevant documents. This will be crucial in maximising the transformative potential of the process.

1a. The Somalia Compact

PSG 1: Inclusive politics

“First of all, we have to reconcile.”

Puntland civil society representative

PSG Strategic Objective: Achieve a stable and peaceful Somalia through inclusive political processes

Priority 1: Advance inclusive political dialogue to clarify and settle relations between the Federal Government and existing and emerging administrations and initiate processes of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities

Priority 2: Finalise and adopt a Federal Constitution by December 2015

Priority 3: Prepare for and hold credible elections by 2016

The main focus under PSG 1 has been on the proposed popular elections in 2016. Dialogue between the Federal Government and administrations, and preparations for the review and finalisation of the Constitution¹⁰ are seen by the Federal Government and some of its international partners as vital steps towards holding the elections.

However, across civil society and communities, many individuals put primary emphasis on social

reconciliation between and within communities, arguing that trust building should be the first priority.¹¹ “The people of Somalia need reconciliation between them,” said youth participants in a focus group discussion in Puntland.¹² This was recognised by one donor, who observed that “for donors, reconciliation is about the elite – there is no effort to look at the real drivers of conflict.”¹³

The draft action plan for PSG 1 does not currently include specific plans to support social reconciliation despite some discussions within the Federal Government on this issue. Reconciliation efforts led by officials from the Federal Government have tended to focus on disputes between elites, particularly in relation to the establishment of administrations in areas recovered from al Shabaab. Questions were raised by civil society and community members who joined focus group discussions as to how sustainable these negotiations and agreements could be without concurrent processes to address historical and emerging conflict, or tensions between clans and other groups.¹⁴ Discussions are ongoing within the PSG 1 Working Group regarding the establishment of a conflict resolution mechanism which should take a wider lens to the vast reconciliation needs between and within communities.

Social reconciliation was seen by many as the basis for all other initiatives under PSG 1, including the settling of the political system, broader constitutional review and adoption, and whether elections could successfully be held by 2016. On the issue of federalism and the establishment of administrations, there was considerable variation on perceptions of its suitability versus other forms of political decentralisation to address longstanding clan issues in Somalia. Many of those interviewed felt that trust-building between communities was essential in underpinning the legitimacy of governance structures both locally and nationally, with the sense that without reconciliation, trust in those administrations to act in the best interests of all populations remains weak.

There was considerable variation in perspectives on **federalism** across South Central and Puntland. Some civil society actors raised the fact that conflict was emerging because of pressure to establish administrations, raising the example of ongoing political disputes between the recognised administration in the South West and its political rival.¹⁵ “Current politics don’t reflect the needs or priorities of the public”, said one civil society leader in Mogadishu. “Every policy creates another conflict - like federalism.”¹⁶ This led to concerns from some that, if not carefully managed, federalism risked establishing clan fiefdoms. Others were more eager to see federalism implemented and pushed for the advancement of specific discussions on resource sharing, aid and financial support under the New Deal.

Given differing perspectives on federalism, it will be a key issue for the constitutional review process to

determine and settle. If these varying opinions are heard properly, it will take time for the final constitution to be agreed. Outreach and dialogue with the public will be crucial to the success and acceptability of the review process. But it will ultimately provide the strongest basis for success in establishing a sustainable and legitimate Somali government.

Alongside the push for social reconciliation to be prioritised, **elections** were generally agreed by civil society members to be a key milestone. “If we don’t have them [elections], then we have lost everything. It is the most important thing”, argued one individual. However, there was some doubt as to their viability in light of the current context and short time to prepare: “People who are not in agreement can’t have elections” said another, claiming that reconciliation needed to happen first.¹⁷

Individuals from traditionally marginalised groups expressed concern about the space they would have to participate in election processes and be represented. Youth interviewed in Puntland complained that they did not have a voice: “We don’t get representation and we don’t get listened to.” Likewise, women in both Puntland and South Central raised concerns about barriers to women’s participation in the elections and expressed considerable scepticism about the process: “Look at Garowe II. They said 30 per cent of parliament would be women and it wasn’t and there were no consequences. So we are not optimistic.”¹⁸

People from communities and civil society saw **land and property** resettlement, particularly for internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees, as crucial, requiring specific attention, particularly as land remains a significant cause of localised conflict. It was seen as an issue of reconciliation as well as justice. “Without [this], we won’t be able to achieve peace and security”, argued one civil society representative in Mogadishu.

PSG 2: Security

“There is [the] problem of al Shabaab who kill our parents and our clan members. This has made people run... Clan conflicts is another issue.”

Child in South Central Somalia

PSG Strategic Objective: Establish unified, capable, accountable, and rights based Somali federal security institutions providing basic safety and security for its citizens.

Priority 1: Strengthen the capacity and accountability of state security institutions to recover territory, stabilize and provide basic safety and security

Priority 2: Integrate security forces into federal institutions

Priority 3: Implement national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants

Priority 4: Develop an effective maritime security strategy within the framework of the Maritime Resource and Security Strategy

To date, the international community and Federal Government’s focus under PSG 2 has been on the **Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF)**. A September 2014 conference in London discussed “the strengthening of the Somali National Army”,¹⁹ highlighting the integration of clan-based, regional and other militias into the SNAF, and a number of structural issues, including ensuring assistance is provided until the Federal Government can finance SNAF salaries directly. Many in civil society critically compared the support given to SNAF with that given to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). They called for increased attention to effectively build the capacity of the SNAF, so that an exit strategy for AMISOM could be developed.²⁰ Civil society also emphasised that any integration of militias – whether clan-based or otherwise – into national security structures should consider both integration *and* demobilisation and disarmament. They were clear that these integration processes must not result in structures centred around clan, and must not reinforce localised clan control or capture of these structures.²¹

In **communities affected by al Shabaab**, participants in focus group discussions highlighted the need to secure areas from al Shabaab incursions and asymmetric attacks, notwithstanding claims that territory had been recovered; “50km away from here, you begin to have killings and hostages”, said one community member. Several people from the business community noted difficulties in transporting goods from Mogadishu: “They do not always reach [here] due to robberies. Sometimes they are taken away by militias.”²²

Community members did not always equate regaining territories from al Shabaab with making their communities safer. People also wanted to see an improvement in their day-to-day security through effective **police service creation and reform**. Many individuals spoke of the need to further build the capacity of local police, including providing hardware and vehicles, and rehabilitating or constructing police stations and posts. Many also raised the need for community-based security policies and practices.²³ Such community focused interventions are absent from the Compact.

Piracy was still seen as an issue by many within civil society in Puntland, who supported the focus on a maritime strategy under PSG 2. However, there were also clear concerns that the maritime force is facilitating international illegal fishing. “We’re not

saying we have the perception that that is what they are doing. That is what they are doing,”²⁴ said one civil society leader in Puntland. For civil society, alternative livelihood programmes – and therefore clear links with PSGs 4 and 5 – were key. In the absence of these, they were concerned that Somalia would continue to rely on international maritime forces to protect against the re-emergence of piracy because the root causes of piracy would remain unaddressed.²⁵

PSG 3: Justice

“Justice itself needs to have teeth.”

Civil society leader, Mogadishu

PSG Strategic Objective: Establish independent and accountable justice institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of Somalia by delivering justice for all.

Priority 1: Key priority laws in the legal framework, including on the reorganization of the judiciary, are aligned with the Constitution and international standards

Priority 2: Justice institutions start to address the key grievances and injustices of Somalis

Priority 3: More Somalis have access to fair and affordable justice

Unlike the other PSGs, PSG 3 places its strategic emphasis on people’s experiences of justice, rather than the capacity of the state. However, it does this through a focus on the reconstitution of a statutory justice system. While a focus on the statutory system was recognised as important by many, so too were **traditional dispute resolution mechanisms**. Many community members spoke of the importance of accessing formal courts if traditional mechanisms failed and so agreed with the need to build the capacity of the statutory system.²⁶ However, they and civil society members across Somalia emphasised the need to reform and strengthen traditional systems alongside the statutory system to ensure both systems meet the needs of people in the country. Some people interviewed spoke of a preference to use traditional systems: “We believe the courts don’t address local grievances, the traditional justice does”,²⁷ though there was an acknowledgment that these systems are not always fair, nor do they always provide justice in specific cases, especially for women. Civil society in particular argued for the inclusion of traditional systems into the PSG 3 objectives for harmonisation and to “overhaul the traditional system to make it better”²⁸ while preserving the flexibility of the role of elders. The Federal Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs has ongoing and planned work on such mechanisms. This

should be formally incorporated into the Compact in order to ensure coordination.

Somalis have the right to both a formal justice system that meets international standards and to access a range of other dispute resolution mechanisms. Many will continue to use and trust traditional systems: “We have to reference the system we have. We have a traditional justice system that has worked. It should be part of our justice system. We shouldn’t just import everything.”²⁹ Strengthening the accountability, responsiveness and transparency of both systems will ensure that people are able to access whatever form of ‘justice’ they feel will best address their needs and that that justice is fair, accountable, transparent and suitable to their needs.

PSG 4: Economic Foundations

PSG Strategic Objective: Revitalize and expand the Somali economy with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth.

Priority 1: Enhance the productivity of high priority sectors and related value chains, including through the rehabilitation and expansion of critical infrastructure for transport, markets access, trade, and energy

Priority 2: Expand opportunities for youth employment through job creation and skills development

Priority 3: Promote the sustainable development and management of natural resources by developing legal and regulatory frameworks and building capacity in key Natural Resources Management (NRM) institutions

During community and civil society consultations, a range of issues emerged relating to PSG 4, many of which were clearly aligned with Compact priorities. One elder in Puntland said “[the] economy is [the] biggest problem”.³⁰ Across communities, there was an emphasis on **supporting traditional livelihoods**, including livestock, fisheries and the expansion of agricultural activities. This is recognised in the Compact; the emphasis in priority 1 of the PSG is to enhance the productivity of “high priority sectors”. Though the milestones set out under this priority speak to the diversification of productive sectors rather than their strengthening per se, they do recognise agriculture, livestock and fisheries as key productive sectors. Additionally, both the World Bank-administered Somalia Multi Partner Fund and the UN-administered Multi Partner Trust Fund have identified these areas among others for initial funding support.

However, while the PSG places particular emphasis on the creation of employment opportunities for youth, many in communities – both men and women – identified the need to specifically support employment for women in addition to youth. One youth in Puntland

said “[we need] small scale investment in businesses for women”, while another noted “[we] need job creation and employment opportunities for women - at present it is hard to pay the rent.”³¹

Environmental issues were also highlighted, particularly in relation to the need for generating alternative employment and preserving the environment. One civil society actor said “we have to prioritise the protection of the environment, particularly because of the humanitarian situation at the moment”.³² Again, the PSG recognises the importance of this, identifying that natural resources can be a driver of conflict. The priority action set out in the Compact in this regard is the creation of a regulatory legal framework for natural resources, including revenue sharing. However, the PSG should clearly consider the need to ensure that livelihoods are strengthened and employment opportunities are created in a manner which expressly considers and mitigates conflict drivers and further environmental degradation.

Many community members raised concerns about the impact of **drought**. “Any progress made is halted when drought strikes”, one woman in South Central said, “before the drought everything was going well...now we’re back to square one...it’s the worst ... drought for some time.”³³ Their concerns indicate the need for greater emphasis under PSG 4 on building community resilience to recurring drought and other cyclical events, such as flooding in Somalia and structural reform. Resilience is mentioned in the humanitarian section of the Compact and there is some donor commitment to supporting resilience activities, while improving livelihood resilience is one of the four priorities for funding under the Somalia Multi-Partner Fund.³⁴ This emphasis is welcome, but in keeping with the principles of the New Deal, the Compact itself must articulate the importance of resilience in building communities’ adaptive, absorptive and transformative capacity while supporting a move away from fragility. There is an onus on implementers and donors to ensure that resilience activities are undertaken using a conflict sensitive lens in order to maximize potential peace dividends as foreseen in the Compact.

PSG 5: Revenue and Services

PSG Strategic Objective: Increase the delivery of equitable, affordable, and sustainable services that promote national peace and reconciliation amongst Somalia’s regions and citizens and enhance transparent and accountable revenue generation and equitable distribution and sharing of public resources

Priority 1: Increase the provision of equitable, accessible, and affordable social services by creating a regulatory environment that promotes decentralized services and prioritizes key

investments that extend and increase access to services

Priority 2: Enhance transparent and accountable revenue generation

Priority 3: Strengthen Public Financial Management (PFM) to enable the different levels of government to better manage financial resources in a transparent and accountable manner, in support of national priorities

As with PSG 4, there was clear agreement with the objective and priorities set out under PSG 5. Civil society agreed with the prioritisation of structural reform, including further public financial management (PFM) and taxation reform in line with priorities 2 and 3. Strengthening and expanding **service delivery**, especially in the water, health and education sectors, were priorities for communities across Somalia. Many individuals spoke of the increasing demand on existing services due to the ongoing drought and military offensives, which had pushed pastoralists and others into towns, villages and IDP camps. In light of this, the emphasis in the Compact on improving access to key services and initial funding under the UN Multi-Partner Fund are welcome.

On **education**, a group of 40 children interviewed in South Central said “they were ready for education” and that “without education there is darkness.”³⁵ Adults also stressed the need for education; a man in South Central said, “Just imagine my son, there are no public schools in this big town with (an) estimate[ed] population of 80,000- 100,000 people. All we have are very few and substandard private schools, hence a reason children are idle”. He continued “Our children are on the street, [in] the last 25 years of anarchy our children learnt only how to carry gun and to shoot, that is the education we [had] here in particular and in Somalia at large.”³⁶

The Compact emphasises the need to improve access to education for an additional one million children by 2016.³⁷ However, it has no explicit focus on the provisions required for recruiting, training and retaining the estimated 25,000 teachers required to educate one million children.³⁸ Many people in communities, particularly in South Central, reported that most teachers had left to seek employment elsewhere due to unpaid salaries and security concerns.³⁹ To attract former and new teachers into the education system, salaries need to be provided for and security improved, again emphasising the crosscutting nature of the PSGs.

1b. The Somaliland Special Arrangement

The Somaliland Special Arrangement is the “sole framework for engagement with Somaliland’s development process under the New Deal partnership”. It is a “separate and distinct” part of the Somali Compact, designed to support the development, peace and security gains in Somaliland.⁴⁰

The SSA has a larger range of priorities under each of the five PGS than the main Compact. PSG 1’s strategic objective is to “build a politically stable and democratic Somaliland that adheres to the principles of good governance”. Its priorities include strengthening electoral processes, increasing parliamentary accountability and strengthening relations between citizens, the state and the media. PSG 2’s objective is to “build professional, capable, accountable and responsive Somaliland security institutions that operate in service of the rights, obligations and protection needs of all sectors of society, while safeguarding deep-rooted peace and stability.” It has six priorities which include a responsive civilian police force, protecting all citizens, particularly women, against sexual and gender-based violence, ensuring conflict sensitivity in resource extraction and reforming the security architecture. PSG 3’s objective is to “improve access to an efficient and effective justice system for all”, with priorities of strengthening the capacity of the courts, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of law-makers, promoting a more responsive and accessible justice system and investing in justice architecture.

PSG 4 intends to “strengthen the management of Somaliland’s natural and productive and human resources, and create an enabling economic and financing environment to maximise economic growth and participation in the regional and global economy”. Its priorities focus on infrastructure and investment, the productive sectors, investment and insurance institutions, employment generation and environmental protection. Finally, PSG 5’s objective is to “build public service capacity to raise revenues, manage resources and ensure the provision of streamlined quality services in an accountable and transparent manner that guarantees inclusiveness and equality.” Priorities include public financial management, the equitable distribution of and access to basic services, and civil service reform.

The SSA more clearly aligns itself to the needs and priorities articulated by both communities and civil society during the research. There was limited consultation and participation in the development of the SSA prior to the Brussels conference, but much of its content was drawn from the National Development

Plan which was developed in a process involving consultations with national and international civil society organisations. This appears to have been a fuller expression of ‘One Vision, One Plan’ principle than was the case for Somalia. Since the Brussels conference, additional consultations with some sections of civil society have further refined the objectives and milestones in the SSA and added objectives under PSG 2 (security).

In the SSA there is little consideration of the various types of conflict that Somaliland experiences. Security was initially omitted from the SSA entirely. However, PSG 2 was added to the SSA framework at the June 2014 High Level Aid Coordination Forum in Hargeisa, Somaliland. Three issues were identified by communities and civil society as absent from the SSA’s security objectives; insecurity in areas near the border between Puntland and Somaliland, localised conflicts over access to resources, particularly between pastoralists in relation to water and grazing lands, and the role of communities, elders and civil society in working with the police to enhance peace and security.⁴¹

As in Somalia, drought has increased local tensions and conflict as resources become scarcer. Efforts under PSGs 4 and 5 that address resource scarcity – including combating environmental degradation – must have a clear conflict sensitivity strategy and be accompanied by measures to appropriately strengthen security and justice. Most communities experiencing localised conflict resolved these using traditional methods, rather than resorting to the statutory system; “most trust is in the customary law”.⁴² Despite this, there is relatively little attention paid to these systems under the SSA; “It is elders who are delivering justice at the local level. They are ignored in [the SSA]. We can’t forget about the customary system.”⁴³ The SSA does make reference to the need to harmonise existing legal systems. This should include specific measures to improve standards within the customary system and the quality of justice it provides, while preserving the flexibility of the role of elders and recognising that traditional systems continue to be used – and in many instances relatively trusted – in Somaliland; “Xeer is not perfect, but it’s faster and more relevant.”⁴⁴

In regard to PSG 4 and 5, communities wanted to see investment in local hardware and capacity across water, health, agriculture, livelihoods and education, as well as a focus on tailored softer interventions, such as improving training for teachers, doctors and health workers. For example in education, several interviewees pointed out the need to invest in boarding schools to ensure the children of pastoralists continued to access education.⁴⁵ Communities and civil society also emphasised a need to provide care for the most vulnerable, including women, people living with disabilities, the unemployed, elderly, orphans, as well as minority clans, and to look to provide income-generating generating activities for

them where appropriate. In light of the drought, emphasis was again on building resilience through projects such as irrigation, environmental protection and alternative employment with a strong push for more to be done for women.⁴⁶

Civil society in Somaliland identified further gaps such as: a lack of civil society involvement in promoting good practise and accountability in the extractive industries and in public finance management; an absence of projects that encourage local food production and a reduction of imported energy; and a need to invest more in microfinance and a sustainable remittance working environment.⁴⁷

The connection between process-oriented objectives and their positive impact on peace and stability for *people* in Somaliland should be more clearly articulated. Across the PSGs, a focus on state capacity enhancement and reform must be explicitly linked to how those processes will positively impact people's lives. While a crucial element in broader statebuilding processes, capacity enhancement in and of itself will not necessarily serve to make Somaliland either more stable or more peaceful. The SSA should more clearly outline or reference existing theories of change setting out these connections, particularly to ensure harmonisation with ongoing reform processes which have been subsequently incorporated into the SSA framework.

Section 2: Implementing the New Deal

Alongside work to address the gaps identified by members of the public and civil society in both the main Somali Compact and the SSA, there is a need to strengthen the *process* of New Deal implementation. As discussions turn towards the *how* and the *where*, Saferworld and World Vision argue that there are a number of issues to consider in order to ensure that the process responds to and reflects the context in which it will be operating.

Ensuring conflict-sensitive approaches

The Compact to some extent acknowledges the importance of conflict sensitive approaches, but this requires further attention from parties involved in its implementation. Measures to ensure that programs are developed in a conflict sensitive manner and that their impact on conflict dynamics is monitored are essential. Yet one of the most critical parts of the New Deal process needed to underpin conflict sensitive approaches – the Fragility Assessment – remains incomplete. Although the process was begun, involving some “pre-consultations” with civil society, it was cut short. Implementation discussions have nevertheless reached the stage of work plans, financing and project commencement. One donor said, “until the Fragility Assessment is done, the New Deal is going to be weak in delivering what it could

deliver....why are we aligning behind objectives if we don't know they're not causing conflict?”⁴⁸

Successful implementation requires that the Fragility Assessment be completed and the Compact updated. This is because it is intended to ground all New Deal activities on a common understanding of the root causes of fragility and conflict, so that interventions can specifically address them. While participants at the Brussels conference in September 2013 committed to continuing consultations “to ... build... on the interim Fragility Assessment”,⁴⁹ and some consultations have taken place, these have largely been negotiations about the role of administrations. They have not been done in the context of either a Fragility Assessment or any form of conflict analysis process. As a result, the diverse drivers of conflict across Somalia have not been clearly articulated nor defined in a wide ranging process. The New Deal objectives thus do not describe how they will specifically address causes and drivers of fragility and conflict, nor how they will avoid further contributing to them. One donor stated “there's a degree of artificiality about the PSGs because there's no common point of understanding of the drivers of conflict- how do we know they're not fuelling conflict?”⁵⁰

The lack of a well-supported, shared understanding of conflict drivers and risks poses a number of concerns, including that the process itself could contribute to, cause, or otherwise exacerbate tensions, conflict, and reinforce fragility, or otherwise only address the symptoms of fragility and not their root causes.

Honestly and openly assessing and mapping conflict drivers requires the participation of a wide range of stakeholders in well designed, carefully facilitated processes. Country-owned and led fragility assessment cannot be the preserve of the authorities or an otherwise narrow group of stakeholders if some of the more difficult issues are to be brought to light. The value of the fragility assessment or any sort of conflict analysis is in its articulation of the broadest range of issues, including those caused by the state and processes of statebuilding.

Conflict Sensitivity: Drought

In communities across Somalia and Somaliland, the impact of the ongoing drought was a recurring concern. INGOs and UN agencies have warned that signs seen in the 2010 pre-famine period are emerging once again. During the research, communities highlighted that many of them were still recovering from the 2011 famine.

In 2014, many people have lost all of their livestock, and with no means of restocking have moved to towns and urban areas, increasing pressure on services. Several interviewed stated it was one of the worst droughts they had seen. Some families reported going without food for multiple consecutive days. As a result, multiple

rising conflicts were identified. These include increasing clashes over access to water points, particularly between pastoralists with remaining livestock, increasing population movements in search of water, failure of businesses and rising unemployment, all adding to tensions around increasing food insecurity and access to services.

Some communities have conflict management systems in place to deal with these conflicts, mostly using traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, but often lacking any official support. PSG 4 includes some focus on water access, but the range of conflict risks and existing conflicts associated with water means interventions to address access to water must be clearly understood. If not designed and managed with conflict risks in mind, such projects can exacerbate local tensions and give rise to new inter-communal tensions, for example related to decisions on the prioritisation of communities for interventions and support and the specific locations of water points. A clear understanding of the overarching and local conflict dynamics must underpin the development of programs. These should link with efforts under PSGs 1 and 2 in particular to reinforce the role of community dialogue, community security approaches and joint management of resources.

Somaliland

Somaliland has undertaken a number of assessments of fragility and conflict drivers across most sectors. These have been used in some instances to inform the priorities set out under each of the PSGs. However, they have not yet been coalesced into one overarching assessment to drive a common and coherent approach across the SSA. The lack of clarity about what the New Deal and the SSA mean for Somaliland in terms of changes from previous development approaches is causing some ambiguity and confusion.

Another key issue for Somaliland is that the relationship between the SSA and the main Somali Compact is not clear, and they appear in some instances to be in conflict with each other. This risks creating conflict or increasing tensions. Their simultaneous implementation in the context of larger Somali statebuilding issues should be clarified through a conflict sensitive lens⁵¹

Enhancing statebuilding with peacebuilding approaches

Processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding are often in tension with each other. Statebuilding is by its nature political and contested. And while of vital importance, in the context of fragility and conflict, badly managed processes of statebuilding can exacerbate differences between political actors, exclude the majority, and lead to further conflict. The value of the New Deal lies in its dual focus on both

statebuilding *and* peacebuilding and their interplay. However, the Somali Compact is silent on issues of peacebuilding. In Somalia, national and local peacebuilding processes, which are needed to reinforce and underpin state reestablishment are being deprioritised in favour of statebuilding processes, particularly the enhancement of the capacity of the Federal Government.

As one international actor put it, “[in Somalia] the New Deal has an increasing focus on state-formation at the cost of nation-building. The centre is being strengthened without the buy-in or support of the rest of the country. The New Deal encourages this as you only get to “play” if you are the recognised state authority. Donors find it much easier to engage with a single recognised entity than multiple parties, so there is a built-in incentive for parties to focus on that relationship.”⁵²

A key issue for those engaged in the New Deal must be how to better enhance statebuilding with peacebuilding. The New Deal rightly recognises the interplay between peacebuilding and statebuilding processes; discussion must centre on how to ensure these processes mutually reinforce each other and together provide a basis for a more sustainable move away from fragility. In order to be a genuinely nationally or Somali owned and led process, addressing the balance between statebuilding and peacebuilding should draw on the specific lessons that can be learned from similar efforts in Somaliland and Puntland.

Community-based approaches and the Somali Compact

The New Deal architecture recognises that meaningful change needs to be based on improving state-society relations, but in practice, this has not been given the attention it requires. Community-based approaches are vital in ensuring that the New Deal reflects and responds to the varying and diverse drivers of conflict and builds local peace and stability, particularly given the currently poor reach of the Federal Government.

Existing and planned processes offer little by way of the realignment of state-society relations. The Somali Compact, in focusing its attention overwhelmingly on state capacity, misses the opportunity to promote the contribution of communities – as important collective actors in their own right – and individuals to their own progress out of fragility and conflict, and build relationships between state institutions and the population.

Top-level structural reform and capacity building is clearly necessary in the Somali context, but should be complemented by peacebuilding activities and by addressing the capacity and relationships between different layers of authority, with a focus on the role communities have to play in creating, sustaining and reinforcing peacebuilding and statebuilding gains.

Individuals interviewed in focus group discussions in communities in South Central emphasised their sense of marginalisation; “no one listens to our voices and we believe it’s the reason we continue suffering...if all our voices are taken, we wouldn’t have suffered for this long.”⁵³

As such, more explicitly ‘community security’⁵⁴ and other community-based and oriented approaches are needed to complement top-level statebuilding. Communities and civil society emphasised the roles elders and the wider community could play – and were playing in some instances – in working with the authorities to address emerging concerns. In one area of South Central, communities stated that they felt they had better security than their surrounding areas because of “coordination, communication and liaison” between the local authority, community elders and other groups.⁵⁵ In Puntland, some women emphasised the need for the community to be engaged in what they described as “peace stabilisation” which included governance, security and justice provision.⁵⁶

Somaliland

The SSA does include some community security approaches under PSG 2, most notably under priority 2 with milestone 3 providing for local policing to be integrated into community security and peace maintenance initiatives, including through reforming and expanding District Safety Committees to act as platforms for community coordination to address security concerns. However, the SSA should go further in integrating these approaches across PSG 2 – particularly in efforts to address sexual and gender-based violence (priority 3 under PSG 2) and ensuring that communities in areas in which extractives exploration takes place had the opportunity to participate in proposed “robust” governance and accountability mechanisms to ensure conflict-sensitive resource extraction (priority 4 under PSG 2). It should also ensure that other PSGs explicitly consider how to involve and engage communities.

For similar reasons, community approaches should be considered across PSGs 4 and 5. This should include consideration of the establishment of community water committees and the retention of community health workers. Such community based approaches can bring benefits to community mobilization, conflict sensitivity and do no harm approaches.

Ensuring a responsive and inclusive process: the role of districts, civil society and the public

The role of districts, regional and future federal state authorities

Since the endorsement of the Compact, the Federal Government has made important efforts to better

include existing and emerging authorities in the process, including working with the Puntland authorities to develop specific priorities in May 2014 and developing a Terms of Reference for regional participation which was circulated to authorities for their input. Participation in New Deal meetings in Mogadishu by other administrations, including regions and future federal states has also improved, though work remains to be done to strengthen trust and confidence between the Federal Government and these layers of authority.

Nevertheless, some state and regional authorities engaged in the process continue to raise concerns about their engagement, in particular on the issue of the sharing of New Deal funds as and when they become available. It is clear that much mistrust between the Federal Government and authorities remains to be addressed. As noted by one person in Puntland: “The New Deal is just in the offices of our respective politicians...it is yet to decentralise ...because it is politicised [and] beyond local people’s reach.”⁵⁷

Beyond the regional or state executive, there should be more effort to engage local administrations, which in many instances are the only governance structures to which communities have access. Some communities spoke of relatively good relationships with their local authorities because of levels of consultation. In contrast, they spoke of minimal levels of interaction and therefore trust in the Federal Government. One community representative in South Central stated “the Federal Government is sealed within the walls of Mogadishu.”⁵⁸

The multiple layers of governance which exist in some instances, or which need to be established in others, must form part of a coherent national structure with clear roles and responsibilities. Existing and emerging legitimate district administrations have the potential to strengthen local peace and stability and should be welcomed into the process alongside regional and state authorities and Members of the Federal Parliament. This strengthening of district legitimacy and inclusivity should help to avoid replicating politics of exclusion. In Somaliland, the strengthening of the decentralisation process being led by the Ministry of Interior with the support of the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG) offers one opportunity to concretely engage on determining the respective roles of different levels of authority.

Civil Society and the public

“We hear the words New Deal, New Deal, New Deal. Lots of people have heard about it, but the reality is no one knows what it is.”

Civil society leader, Mogadishu

There are some encouraging signs of greater inclusivity and involvement of civil society

organisations. A meeting in Mogadishu in October 2014 involving 200 people, including civil society representatives and regional administrations discussed the New Deal process to date. There has also been – albeit limited and irregular – participation of some civil society representatives in PSG Working Groups and in meetings ahead of the Copenhagen High Level Partnership Forum meeting in November 2014.

However, at times both government figures and donors have argued that civil society organisations do not have a role to play in the New Deal, or that this role should be limited to awareness raising. This is despite the New Deal structure explicitly providing for *country-led* rather than *state-led* processes, for a range of roles for civil society including in the fragility assessment and compact development processes, and stating that the New Deal should “ensure efficient support to build critical capacities of the state and civil society in a balanced manner.”⁵⁹

There is clearly a role for civil society organisations in bridging between the authorities and the wider population for information sharing and supporting public participation. However, many civil society groups were critical of the level of information sharing and participation they had experienced. Many participants in civil society consultations were aware of the overarching New Deal framework, but few understood what the Compact was intended to do. Fewer still knew its content. “We don’t know the objectives of the Somali Compact or how it is structured,” said one civil society leader in Mogadishu, “Neither we nor the public have enough information about the New Deal.”⁶⁰

Many within civil society were critical of the fact that the Compact and associated materials were only available in English and not in Somali, which prevented a wider range of civil society actors and the broader public from engaging with it, and of the lack of public engagement. Members of civil society argued for a joint task force between the authorities and civil society to “agree a vision for the New Deal...and use different channels to reach the public.”⁶¹ They argued for particular attention to be paid to the needs of different communities and groups in accessing and responding to information about the New Deal, including women, youth, IDPs and marginalised clans as well as the different needs between urban and rural populations.⁶²

While civil society organisations wanted to claim a role in representing the public within the New Deal framework, all those involved in consultations agreed that this did not preclude greater direct public awareness and engagement; “the public should be asked about their priority needs,” said one civil society actor.⁶³ The Federal Government in coordination with other administrations can and should go directly to the public both to inform them about the process to date and to seek their input.

Some donors have argued that civil society actors need to be united before they could be included within the New Deal.⁶⁴ These claims misrepresent the nature of civil society in any context. Civil society is made up of a range of actors representing an extensive set of interests, and working on myriad issues. Their views will not always be – and should not always be – common. Only through exposing authorities and decision-makers to a wide variety of views and perspectives from society can states become more responsive to its needs. At the minimum, this should be understood as a means to overcome the information and knowledge gaps that can distort statebuilding. This should also be seen in the context of establishing accountability from authorities across Somalia and securing genuine country ownership over the New Deal process.

In addition, many civil society organisations have and continue to play essential roles delivering basic services and carrying out other state functions, filling the gap created by Somalia’s protracted state collapse. They have technical expertise, experience and engagement with local communities across the country that are essential for the successful development and implementation of programs under the New Deal. They have much to offer to both the Federal Government and its international partners in sharing this experience and expertise to build the capacity of the state to begin to provide such services. Some national civil society representatives were clear that they wanted a larger role in the process: “We won’t be convinced with information only. We want to be cooks. We want full participation.”⁶⁵ Reluctance to take advantage of this would be damaging to the longer term potential of the New Deal process.

Many donors have not been strongly supportive of effective and independent engagement of civil society at all levels of the process. For example, they have accepted that only three civil society representatives have been invited to attend the High Level Partnership Forum meeting in Copenhagen in November 2014, as part of the official Somali delegation and picked by the government. There is no fully independent Somali civil society participation. Such actions risk undermining the independence and legitimacy of civil society in Somalia, and erodes trust, both within civil society and of the government.

Somaliland

Civil society has been relatively more engaged in the SSA, including in the development of Somaliland’s progress report for the November 2014 Copenhagen HLPF. While some in civil society had a relatively high awareness of both the overarching New Deal process and the SSA, others argued that only a narrow section of civil society, particularly those based in Hargeisa, have been engaged in the process to date, with work remaining to engage a broader range of civil society actors both by the Somaliland authorities

and the international community.⁶⁶ Public awareness of, and information about, the process also remains minimal and more effort is needed to improve awareness and engagement including by making information available in the Somali language.

Some civil society actors and organisations have been able to engage through forums including the High Level Aid Coordination Forum (HLACF); however the space for formal engagement and interaction with other governing structures of the SSA including the SSA Steering Committee should be strengthened. Such interaction and engagement should be structured and organised, and be clear about how it will engage with regional civil society, including through the Decentralisation Programme. This could serve to enhance civil society engagement with local authorities in Somaliland on the implementation of the SSA.

Effective monitoring and evaluation

The World Bank is working with the Aid Coordination Unit (ACU, which sits in the Ministry of Finance) and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation in Somalia, and the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Somaliland to develop the monitoring and evaluation frameworks for the Compact and the SSA.

For the Somali Compact, the draft framework would measure indicators of progress towards achieving the PSG outcomes, the short-term actions needed to achieve PSG tasks and activities, the partnership principles and aid effectiveness and flows of development assistance.⁶⁷ While it is critical that links should be explicitly drawn between these four different components, the draft concept note currently suggests that these elements will be measured by separate sets of data. This means that the relationship between the monitoring of aid flows and partnership principles and their contribution to the completion of specific tasks under each PSG is unclear, as is the link between the completion of specific PSG tasks to the overall achievement of the intended outcomes under each of the PSGs.

While the commitment to using the shared indicators developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) is welcome, these should be complemented with Somalia-specific indicators. Indicators should be capable of accurately capturing change across the vastly different political, security and economic contexts across Somalia and balance the measurement of completion of tasks and improved performance of Somali authorities and donors, with the measurement of changes in people's lives. These indicators should be developed with input from state actors at Federal, state, regional and district levels, as well as the active involvement of civil society to ensure they can accurately measure changes that are meaningful to Somalis.

In Somalia, the specific commitment in the cross-cutting issues to focusing particularly on the "protection of the rights of the most vulnerable

groups, such as IDPs, women, children and elderly" and to delivering "tangible and visible peace dividends to all Somali citizens" must be explicitly measured and tested under the monitoring and evaluation framework.⁶⁸ Currently, the Compact only provides for specific monitoring of the progress of women and girls' access and participation in looking at progress against the key PSG milestones- and the draft concept note is silent on how this is to be done. The measurement and evaluation of progress across a range of traditionally marginalised groups should be more clearly defined, this should include balancing statistical reviews with specific perception surveying within and across categories of marginalisation, which according to communities in South Central, includes youth, women, children, people living with disabilities, internally displaced persons and minority clans.⁶⁹

Somaliland

The SSA makes commitments to strengthening citizen-state relations and monitoring processes to ensure the "effective participation, accountability, transparency and responsiveness [of the state to] all citizens on a daily basis" as well as upholding the human rights of people in Somaliland.⁷⁰ Progress in implementing these commitments must be measured through assessing the impact of work under the SSA in addressing and improving the lived realities of traditionally marginalised people in Somaliland as well as the overall impact for people generally. As with the Somalia M&E framework, this should include the development of specific Somaliland indicators to complement international indicators involving the range of state actors and civil society organisations and include specific focus on traditionally marginalised groups.

Coordination with ongoing humanitarian and resilience efforts

In parallel to discussions around the New Deal, humanitarian needs in Somalia are likely to further increase with the ongoing military offensive and the current drought. The Somali Compact commits to facilitating full humanitarian access, to respect humanitarian principles and to not interfere.⁷¹

In addition to immediate humanitarian needs, service provision in most parts of Somalia is still highly dependent on humanitarian actors. A community group in South Central said "the community lacks government support while basic needs are not enough". In order to facilitate improvements and expansion of service provision to the Somali population, PSG 5 needs to map out current service providers across Somalia and develop a time bound, phased transition plan by service needs and geographic area. While recognising that as state capacity is being built service provision will continue to be delivered by existing actors, this would help to address the needs of the Somali population in the

short term and prevent conflicts over access to resources.

The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)⁷² for Somalia remains underfunded, despite needs being high. At the same time there is a need to begin to rebuild the state in Somalia and invest in peacebuilding, taking a longer term outlook. There are clear cut locations in Somaliland and Somalia where it is easy to distinguish whether New Deal or humanitarian funding is most appropriate. However, it is most likely that some places may become eligible for both, particularly in communities that host large numbers of IDPs. It is important to note that humanitarian needs must always remain separate and impartial. Donors should remain vigilant to avoid having to choose between funding either the New Deal or humanitarian activities. There may however be potential to exploit the complementarity of shorter term humanitarian funding with longer term New Deal programs.

The past three years have also seen an increase in resilience programming in both the humanitarian and development sectors.⁷³ Resilience interventions are integral to humanitarian and long term development depending on the type of activity – and are essential to the concept of the New Deal. Building social safety nets is an important element of humanitarian response as they can contribute to mitigate the impact of shock on households. Likewise, without resilience underpinning natural resource management and activities in the productive sectors, specifically agriculture (farming, livestock and fisheries) in PSG 4, there will be a critical gap in communities being able to respond to future shocks. In the context of another humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the need for a greater focus on resilience and support to communities across both humanitarian and development funding streams is particularly crucial.

At present there is little clarity on the scope of humanitarian and resilience activities and where they fit within the current aid architecture. There is a need by the aid community and Federal Government to map current and planned activities in order to avoid competition, duplication and potential outbreaks of conflict over resources, and also to ensure coordination and equal access.

Conclusion

One year after the endorsement of the Somali Compact, there are issues which require attention to maximise its potential success. While there is a significant alignment between the PSGs in their current form and the priorities articulated by members of communities and civil society, there are a number of critical gaps. Current objectives should be revised and updated to acknowledge and respond to these needs and plans developed to implement elements of the Compact which have been relatively ignored to date. Implementation also needs to be firmly rooted in

conflict sensitive and participatory approaches, underpinned by a clear common understanding of the conflict drivers in Somalia which would come from a finalised Fragility Assessment.

For Somaliland, whilst the objectives of the SSA aligned more clearly to the needs and priorities articulated by communities and civil society, the connection between process-oriented objectives and their positive impact on peace and stability for *people* in Somaliland should be more clearly articulated. For PSG 2 and 3 there needs to be better consideration of the various types of conflict that Somaliland experiences, such as localised conflicts over access to resources. A clear conflict sensitivity strategy and appropriate security and justice strengthening are required.

The range of views shared by participants during the research are indicative of the broader range of concerns and priorities within both civil society and the public that must be taken into account by those involved in the New Deal processes in Somalia and Somaliland. As these actors take stock of the progress – or lack thereof – to date, they must urgently find ways to address weaknesses in the New Deal processes and structures to ensure that they are increasingly inclusive of and responsive to the needs, priorities and concerns of citizens. As the ultimate beneficiaries of New Deal processes, all Somali people must be at the heart of peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts if they are to be truly transformational.

Recommendations

The Federal Government should:

- **Recognise the gaps that exist in the objectives of the Somali Compact and begin to implement widespread consultations with communities and civil society to address these gaps in order to and ensure that the Compact is truly reflective of the needs of all Somalis. This briefing has identified twelve specific areas that merit further consideration by the Government:**

PSG 1: Inclusive politics

- **Prioritising the development and implementation of an inclusive process of national social reconciliation to underpin other on-going efforts under PSG 1 and the broader Compact.**

PSG 2: Security

- **Prioritising the establishment of an effective, accountable and responsive police service that is focused on the security needs of communities across the country.**

- **Clearly setting out community security based approaches in the Compact which support collaboration between the police and communities in jointly identifying and addressing security concerns.**
- **Including optional measures for the demobilisation of militias as well as their integration into the SNAF.**
- **Setting out specific measures which will be taken to ensure that the SNAF is not built along clan lines.**
- **Based on the Fragility Assessment, conduct analysis, scenario planning for unintended consequences and risks, and take concrete actions to ensure that the Compact and PSG work plans are conflict sensitive and firmly rooted in an understanding of how planned activities could drive or reinforce conflict. Given the politicised nature of statebuilding, this will be especially important with regards to capacitation of Federal Government and other administrative institutions.**

PSG 3: Justice

- **Integrating ongoing work under the Ministry of Justice to support traditional dispute resolution mechanisms into the Compact. Ensure clear coordination between efforts to support traditional justice mechanisms to become increasingly accountable and the reform of the statutory legal system.**

PSG 4: Economic Foundations

- **Prioritising resilience building activities while maintaining a clear distinction between humanitarian resilience activities and those under the New Deal.**
- **Ensuring that employment generation targets all social groups, with particular emphasis on the range of traditionally marginalised groups, including women as well as youth.**
- **Identifying the cross-overs between economic objectives and other PSGs in order to ensure coordination and coherence in approach.**

PSG 5: Revenue and Services

- **Setting out clearly the strategy and timeline for the recruitment, training and retention of teachers as part of efforts to support access to education for an additional one million children.**
- **Including a cohesive, time-bound and phased transition plan for services from humanitarian actors to Somali authorities. This should be developed in close consultation with humanitarian actors.**
- **Ensuring capacity building for service delivery within authorities is aligned with the transition plan and clearly communicated to communities and civil society.**
- **Complete a comprehensive Fragility Assessment that includes the views of the widest range of Somalis and ensure it is regularly updated. The schedule and detailed plans for this process should be publicly available. The finalised Fragility Assessment should be used to draw out coherent and harmonised baseline indicators for monitoring and evaluation across all the PSGs.**

- **Involve communities and civil society organisations in the design, realisation, monitoring and evaluation of PSG objectives. Increase information sharing in the Somali language, outreach and open and regular dialogue, including through the media.**
- **Support the engagement of the widest range of civil society, including regional civil society groups, to include their perspectives and utilise their technical expertise, particularly within the PSG Working Groups and Sub-Working Groups.**
- **Ensure approaches across all the PSGs include a focus on positive impacts on communities, appropriate to their different development needs. This should include community-based approaches to strengthen local ownership and participation.**
- **Harmonise monitoring and evaluation processes to ensure that the links between outcomes, outputs and performance under each of the PSGs are effectively assessed. Disaggregate monitoring indicators across a wide range of marginalized populations including IDPs, women, people living with disabilities, children, and minority clans.**

The Somaliland authorities should:

- **Recognise that gaps exist in the objectives of the SSA and develop a programme of widespread consultations, including with communities and civil society to address these gaps and ensure the SSA is truly reflective of the needs of people in Somaliland.**
- **Strengthen structures provided for in the SSA, including the Steering Committee to ensure greater interaction and coordination between the authorities, donors and civil society. Particular emphasis should be given to facilitating the active engagement of regional civil society, including through the Decentralisation Programme.**
- **Ensure civil society have a clear role in the design of state monitoring mechanisms. Monitoring indicators in the SSA should be harmonised and disaggregated across a wider**

range of marginalised populations, including women, people living with disabilities, children and minority clans.

- **Continue to proactively consult and engage a wide range of civil society actors and conduct outreach and consultation with the Somaliland public in the implementation of the SSA, with a focus on widespread information sharing in the Somali language, including through the media.**

The international community should:

- **Support the Federal Government, Somaliland authorities and other stakeholders in the New Deal processes to conduct wide-ranging consultations with communities and civil society in order to identify and address gaps in the Compact, including through financial support where necessary.**
- **Support the finalisation of the Fragility Assessment before any further implementation is carried out, recognising the risks of continuing without ensuring that the Compact is rooted in a common understanding of the drivers of conflict and that all activities are conflict sensitive. This should be a pre-requisite for further implementation, and build in regular conflict updates, reflecting the spirit of the living nature of the Somali Compact and SSA.**
- **Provide timely and transparent information to monitoring and evaluation processes on their activities in Somalia and Somaliland to monitoring and evaluation structures and promote an environment of mutual accountability between themselves, the government, civil society and implementers.**
- **Support and promote inter-civil society coordination, representation and engagement on the New Deal process through information sharing and, if necessary, financial support.**
- **Clarify the coordination, harmonisation and distinction between humanitarian, resilience and development programming. Where both development and humanitarian funding are designated for the same location, clarify the process which will be used to ensure that programming is complementary and avoids unintended harm.**

¹ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

² Communiqué, A New Deal for Somalia, Brussels Conference, 16 September 2013, <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/Somali%20New%20Deal%20Conference%20-%20Communique.pdf>

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Saferworld and World Vision do not take a position on Somaliland's claim to independence. While the terms "Somalia" and "Somaliland" are used in this briefing, this is for the purposes of distinguishing the main Compact text from the Somaliland Special Arrangement only. No inference as to Somaliland's independence should be made from the language used in this briefing.

⁵ Invitations to focus group participants sought to ensure that in each region community elders, women, men, young adults and children were consulted. Additionally, in South Central, a balanced representation from both IDP camps and host communities were included.

⁶ For the purposes of this report, civil society is defined as groups or individuals who act and speak in support of the interests of citizens in Somalia. It includes both national and international NGOs. Individuals were invited to join consultations on the basis of their experience working on issues addressed under the Compact, taking care to ensure both a regional and gender balance across the consultations.

⁷ Saferworld and World Vision would like to thank SOSSENSA, PUNSAA and SONSAF for their assistance in convening the civil society consultations as well as the individuals who agreed to be interviewed for this briefing.

⁸ International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, "A New Deal for engagement in fragile states", <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/new-deal-for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf>

⁹ The Somali Compact, <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf>

¹⁰ The current Constitution is provisional and a number of its provisions are the subject of considerable debate.

¹¹ Civil society consultation, Garowe, 9 September 2014; community focus group discussions with communities, 10 September 2014; civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014; community focus group discussions and interviews, South Central, 24-27 September 2014

¹² Youth focus group discussion, Puntland, 10 September, 2014

¹³ Interview with donor, Nairobi, 24 September 2014

¹⁴ Civil society consultation, Garowe, 9 September 2014; community focus group discussions with communities, 10 September 2014; civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014; community focus group discussions and interviews, South Central, 24-27 September 2014

¹⁵ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014; Two competing administrations emerged from clan conferences held during 2013 and 2014. The first, known as South West 3, claimed an area of territory encompassing the Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle, while the second, South West 6, claimed an area including Bay, Bakool and Lower Shabelle but extending to Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba. The latter three had a previously

recognised administration known as the Juba Interim Administration. After negotiations, the South West 3 administration was recognised by the Federal Government and its international partners.

¹⁶ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

¹⁷ Civil society consultations, Mogadishu 18 September 2014 and Garowe, 9 September 2014

¹⁸ Civil society consultations, Garowe, 9 September 2014. The Garowe II agreement paved the way for the end of the mandate of the Transitional Federal Government and selection of the current Federal Government. The agreement committed to ensuring that 30% of Members of Parliament were female, however, only 14% of seats are actually held by women.

¹⁹ *Support to the Somali National Army (SNA), Communique*, 18 September 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/support-to-the-somali-national-army>

²⁰ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

²¹ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

²² Community focus group discussions, South Central Somalia, 17 September, 2014 and Puntland, 10 September, 2014

²³ Community focus group discussion, South Central Somalia, 16-17 September, 2014, and Puntland 10 September 2014

²⁴ Civil Society consultation, Garowe, 9 September, 2014

²⁵ Civil society consultation, Garowe, 9 September 2014

²⁶ Community focus group discussions, South Central Somalia, 16-17 September 2014 and Puntland 10 September 2014

²⁷ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

²⁸ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

²⁹ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

³⁰ Elder, focus group discussion, Puntland, 10 September, 2014

³¹ Women representatives, focus group discussion, Puntland, 10 September 2014

³² Civil society consultation, Garowe, 9 September 2014

³³ Women representatives, focus group discussion, South Central, 16 September 2014

³⁴ One of two funding windows under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF). The other is administered by the UN.

³⁵ Focus group discussion with children, South Central, 17 September 2014

³⁶ Interview with resident in South Central Somalia, 24 September 2014

³⁷ The Somali Compact, page 10. The Indicator from the go-to-school programme. There are currently around 400,000 in school in South Central, 150,000 in Somaliland, and

100,000 in Puntland. Of the 1 million (500:300:200 allocation), 900,000 children unfunded at an approximate estimated cost of USD 117 million..

³⁸ For this report, the authors used the UNEE Minimum Standards for Education, which has a general Teacher: Student ratio of 1:40. There are currently around 400,000 children in school in South Central, 150,000 in Somaliland, and 100,000 in Puntland

³⁹ Focus group discussions and interviews, South Central, 17-18 September, 2014

⁴⁰ The Somali Compact, page 20

⁴¹ Community focus group discussions, Somaliland, 13 September 2014; Civil society consultation, Hargeisa, 13 September 2014

⁴² Village elder, community focus group discussion, Somaliland 13 September 2014

⁴³ Civil society consultation, Hargeisa, 13 September 2014

⁴⁴ Civil society consultation, Hargeisa, 13 September 2014

⁴⁵ Community focus group discussions, Somaliland, 13 September 2014

⁴⁶ Community focus group discussions, Somaliland, 13 September 2014; Civil society consultation, Hargeisa, 13 September 2014

⁴⁷ Civil society consultation, Hargeisa, 13 September 2014

⁴⁸ Interview with donor, Nairobi, 24 September 2014

⁴⁹ *Communique: A New Deal for Somalia, Brussels Conference, 16 September 2013,*

<http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/Somali%20New%20Deal%20Conference%20-%20Communique.pdf>

⁵⁰ Interview with donor, Nairobi, 24 September 2014

⁵¹ Interview with international NGO, 16 October 2014

⁵² Interview with international actor, Nairobi, 9 September 2014

⁵³ Community focus group discussions, South Central, 24 September 2014

⁵⁴ Saferworld defines community security as a people-centred approach to addressing insecurity that integrates human security, development and statebuilding paradigms. It works by bringing together a wide range of state and civil society actors from the security demand and supply sides to identify root causes of insecurity collectively and develop coordinated responses to them. The approach builds the capacity and willingness of communities, local authorities and security providers to address their own sources of insecurity. It creates an enabling environment for wider reforms and more people focused policies at the sub-national and national levels, *Community Security Manual*, <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/806-community-security-handbook>

⁵⁵ Community focus group discussions, South Central, 17 September 2014

⁵⁶ Community focus group discussions, Puntland, 10 September 2014

⁵⁷ Interview, Puntland, 10 September 2014

⁵⁸ Community focus group discussions, South Central Somalia, 17 September 2014

⁵⁹ International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, *A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*, <http://www.newdeal4peace.org/wp-content/themes/newdeal/docs/new-deal-for-engagement-in-fragile-states-en.pdf>

⁶⁰ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

⁶¹ Civil Society consultation, Garowe, 9 September, 2014

⁶² Civil society consultation, Garowe, 9 September 2014 and Mogadishu 18 September 2014

⁶³ Civil society consultation, Mogadishu, 18 September 2014

⁶⁴ Interviews with donors, 9-11 September 2014

⁶⁵ Civil society consultation, Garowe, 9 September 2014

⁶⁶ Civil society consultation, Hargeisa, 13 September 2014

⁶⁷ Draft Concept Note for Developing a Somali Compact Monitoring Framework, August 2014

⁶⁸ The Somali Compact, pages 11-12, <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf>

⁶⁹ Community focus group discussions, South Central Somalia, 18 September, 2014

⁷⁰ The Somali Compact, page 26, <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf>

⁷¹ The Somali Compact, page 16, <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf>

⁷² The Consolidate Appeal Process, CAP, is led by UN Office for Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and is a coordinated series of actions undertaken to help prepare for, manage and deliver humanitarian response via a common fundraising mechanism. At time of writing, the CAP was only funded at 34%, leaving a gap of \$617 Million to meet humanitarian needs by the end of 2014.

⁷³ Resilience activities have been undertaken bilaterally and via three international consortia working across the country, the consortia include UN (FAO, UNICEF, WFP), BRiCS (NRC, Concern and Save the Children) and SomReP (ADRA, ACF, DRC, COOPI, CARE, OXFAM and World Vision). Resilience is defined by the Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP) as “the ability of communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses –particularly recurrent drought– without compromising their long-term prospects.”